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Richard C. Ausness
Introduction
The United States Supreme Court handed down an opinion in the Cipollone
case on June 24, 1992.' Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded
that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act' preempted all tort
claims against cigarette manufacturers based on failure to provide adequate warn-
ings about the health risks of smoking." However, the Court also held that
claims based on breach of express warranty, misrepresentation, and conspiracy
were not preempted by the Act. 4 Thus, although Cipollone represents a clear
victory for tobacco companies, it also leaves the door open for future litigation.
The first part of this Article will discuss the concept of federal preemption.
The second part will examine various theories of statutory interpretation pro-
posed by members of the Court. This portion of the Article will also evaluate
the Court's treatment of the preemption issue in Cipollone. Finally, the third part
will consider the effect of the Cipollone decision on other product liability claims.
Preemption and Cigarette Warnings
The Health Risks 0/ Smoking
It is estimated that 350,000 persons die each year from the effects of ciga-
rette smoking.' Scientists have known for years that smoking causes lung can-
cer,' but smoking has now been linked to cancer of the stomach, cervix,
pharynx, esophagus, bladder, pancreas, and kidney as well." In addition, stud-
ies suggest that smoking increases the risk of cardiovascular disease' and
I. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (hereinafter cited as Cipollone).
2. 15 U.S.c. §§1331 et seq. (198, & Supp. Ill. 1985).
3. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621-22.
4. [d. at 2623-24.
5. See Comment, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses to Cigarette Smok-
ing Injuries, 36 CATH. V.L. REV. 643, 643 n. 2 (1987).
6. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, Smoking and Health, Report of the Advi-
sory Committee to the Surgeon General oj the Public Health Service, 31 (1964); U.S. Dep't of
Health, Education and Welfare, The Health Consequences oj Smoking: Cancer, Report oj the Sur-
geon General, at v (1982).
7. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, The Health Consequences oj Smoking:
Cancer, Report oj the Surgeon General, 1-10 to 1-1-17 (1982).
8. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, The Health Consequences oj Smoking:
Cardiovascular Disease, Report oi the Surgeon General, at iv-vi (1983).
1
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chronic obstructive lung diseases? Furthermore, medical evidence indicates that
smoking by pregnant women causes health problems for their unborn children.'?
Litigation Against Cigarette Manufacturers
For more than three decades, injured consumers have tried to recover against
tobacco companies for smoking-related injuries." At first, litigants relied on
negligence and implied warranty theories," but later switched to strict liability
in tort." Under the this theory, product manufacturers are strictly liable to con-
sumers for injuries caused by manufacturing defects, design defects, or failure
to warn. 14 Most claims against cigarette companies have been based on failure
to provide an adequate warning of the health risks of smoking. IS
Warnings must be adequate with respect to factual content, expression, and
method of communication." Adequacy in terms of content means that the
warning must be accurate and complete. I? The product seller must disclose an
known risks and reveal the specific nature and magnitude of these risks." A
warning must also be communicated in language that is clear and understand-
9. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare, The Health Consequences of Smoking:
Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease, Report of the Surgeon General, at vii (1984).
10. See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Reducing the Health Consequences of
Smoking, Report of the Surgeon General, 71-76 (1989).
II. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L.
REV, 1423, 1425 (1980).
12. E.g., see Ross v. Philip Morris, Inc., 328 F.2d 3 (8th CiT. 1964) (implied warranty); Lar-
tigue v. R.i. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 {yth Cir. 1963), cert. denied. 375 U.S. 865 (1963)
(negligence); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 {yth Cir. 1962), question cert. on reh'g,
154 So. ad 169 (Fla. 1963), rev'd and remanded on reh'g, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd per
curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir: 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 91 I (1970) (implied warranty); Pritch-
ard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (jd Cir. 1961), aff'd on reh'g, 350 F.2d 479
(jd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. de-
nied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967) (negligence).
13. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OF TORTS§402A (1965).
14. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984); Voss v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.
1978).
15. See Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and Alternative Com-
pensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSEL. REV. 897, 901 (1988); Note, Strict Products Liability on the
Move: Cigarette Manufacturers May Soon Feel the Heat, 23 SANDIEGOL. REv. 1137, 1138 (1986).
16. See Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict Products Liability: What Liability
Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 Kv.L.J. 705, 716-717
(1989-90).
17. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1St Cir. 1981); Graham v.
Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987); Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 677 P.2d
1147, 1182 (Cal. 1984); Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 823-24 (Tex. 1978).
18. See Ellis v. International Ptaytex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1984) (tampon man-
ufacturer required to disclose risk of toxic shock syndrome); Reid v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 253 S.E.2d
344, 349~50 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (deodorant manufacturer required to disclose risk of flamma-
bility); Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 398 A.2d 132, '40 (N.J. Super. 1979) (aspirin manu-
facturer required to disclose risk of ulcers from use of product).
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able.'? Furthermore, a warning must be phrased with sufficient emphasis to
ensure that product users will exercise caution.P' Thus, statements that minimize
dangers or provide misleading assurances of safety will not be considered ade-
quate." Finally, warnings must be communicated to anyone who might be
endangered by the product."
Cigarette warnings are clearly inadequate when measured by these stan-
dards." There were no health warnings at all on cigarette packaging prior to
the enactment of federal labeling legislation in 1965. '4 Even now, health warn-
ings are not conspicuous, nor are they sufficiently forceful to be effective." In
addition, existing warnings are not specific enough to satisfy the duty to
waru." Until recently, cigarette warnings said nothing about the risk of lung
cancer, heart disease, pulmonary disease, or any other specific smoking-related
illness." Moreover, warnings still do not inform smokers about the likelihood
and magnitude of potential injury. 28 In addition, health warnings say nothing
about the addictive qualities of nicotine." Finally, the promotional efforts of
cigarette manufacturers have diluted the effects of health warnings.:'"
Although the failure to warn theory would seem to be a compelling one,
tobacco companies have avoided liability by contending that such claims are
19. See MacDonald v. ortno Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65. 71-72 (Mass. 1985) (ref-
erence to "cerebral thrombosis insufficient to disclose risk of stroke).
20. See Note, Mass Immunization Cases; Drug Manufacturers' Liability for Failure to Warn,
29 VAND.L. REV. 235. 254-55 (1976); Note, Alternatives to Manufacturer Liability for Injuries
Caused by the Sabin-Type Oral Polio Vaccines, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 71 r, 725 (1986-87).
21. See Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 4' A.2d 850, 853 (Pa. 1945) (Words "Safety Kleen"
prominently displayed on cleaning fluid container diluted effect of small print warning).
22. See Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct jor Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, '3 ST.
MARY'SL.J. 521, 566 (1981-82).
23. See Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and Alternative Com-
pensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSEL. REV. 897, 908 (1988).
24. See Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?, 29 ARIz.
L. REV. 195, 208-09 (1987).
25. See Note, The Great American Smokeout: Holding Cigarette Manufacturers Liable for Fail-
ing to Provide Adequate Warnings of the Hazards oj Smoking, 27 B.C.L. REV. 1033, 1065 (1986).
26. See Comment, Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for Smoking Induced Illnesses and
Deaths, 18 RUTGERSL.J. 165, 178 (1986).
27. See Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and Alternative Com-
pensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSEL. REV. 897, 909 (1988). In 1984, the Act was amended to require
one of four warnings to be placed on cigarette packages on a revolving basis. These warnings
declared that smoking could cause lung cancer, heart disease, emphysema, fetal injury, premature
birth, low birth weight. Pub. L. No. 98-474, §4, 98 stat. 2200 (1984), now codified at 15 U.S.c.
§ 1333(a)(I) (Supp. 1lI, 1985).
28. See Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?, 29 ARIz.
L. REV. 195,211 (1987).
29. Note, Preemption of Recovery in Cigarette Litigation: Can Manufacturers Be Sued jor Fail-
ure to Warn Even Though They Have Complied with Federal Warning Requirements, 20 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 867, 914 (1987).
30. See Note, Constitutional Realism: Legislative Bans on Tobacco Advertising and the First
Amendment, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1I93, 12°7; Comment, Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers for
Smoking Induced lIInesses and Deaths, 18 RUTGERSL.J. 165, 183 (1986).
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preempted by federal cigarette labeling legislation. At the time of the. Supreme
Court's decision in Cipollone, six federal circuit courts and a number of other
federal and state courts had held failure to warn claims to be preemption by
federal lawY Only a few state courts have refused to accept this preemption
argument. 32
The legislation in question is the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act.33 This statute was first enacted in 1965 and became effective on January I,
1966.34 The Act required all cigarette packages to contain the following warn-
ing: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health."" The
Act also stated that Congress intended to establish a comprehensive program with
respect to cigarette labeling and advertising in order to inform the public about
the hazards of smoking and to protect the national economy by excluding diverse
and confusing labeling requirements." When the Act was amended in 1969,37
Congress strengthened the language of the mandatory warning.P
Both the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act contained express preemption provi-
sions." The preemption provision of the 1969 Act is presently codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1334. Section 1334(a) provides that no statement relating to health risks
from smoking shall be required on cigarette packages other that the statement
required by section 1333 of the Act."" Section 1334(b) declares that no addi-
tional requirements or prohibitions relating to smoking and health may be
imposed under state law with respect to advertising or promotion activities."
These provisions clearly prohibit states from imposing mandatory labeling
31. See Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217. 1222 (1St Cir. 1990); Pennington v.
Vistron Corp., 876 Ead 414. 421 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.i. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 849 Rad
23°,234-35 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 626 (1St Cir. 1987), cerro
denied, 109 S. Ct. 838 (1989); Stephen v. American Brands, 825 F.2d 312, 313 (r rth Cir. (987);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 798 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043
(1987); Cianitis v. American Brands, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 853, 8S9 (D.N.H. (988); Gunsalus v. Celotex
Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Forster v. R.I. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d
655,660 (Minn. 1990); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417, 420 (Pa. Super. 199°);
Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Industries. Inc., 769 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
32. See Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239. 1255 (N.J. 1990); Carlisle v.
Philip Morris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 517 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§1331-40 (1982 & Supp. 1lI, 1985).
34. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 283 (1965).
35. Id. at §4-
36. Id. at §2, now codified at 15 U.S.c. §1331 (1982).
37. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 88 (1969).
38. Jd. §4. The required warning was changed to read: "Warning: The Surgeon General Has
Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health." ld.
39. Pub. L. No. 89-92, §5, 79 Stat. 283 (1965): Pub. L. No. 91-222, §5, 84 Stat. 88 (1969).
40. 15 U.S.C. §1334(a) (1982). The statement required by §1333 originally declared "Caution:
Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." In 1969, the statement was changed to
"Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your
Health." Since 1984. tobacco companies are required to place one of four warnings (on a revolv-
ing basis) on cigarette packaging. ld. § 1333(a)(I) (West Supp. 1987).
41. [d. §1334(b) (1982).
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requirements for cigarette packaging or advertising by statute or administrative
regulation;" However, it is not so clear whether section 1334, or any other sec-
tion of the federal act, preempts damage claims against tobacco companies under
principles of state tort law.
The Preemption Doctrine
Under the Supremacy Clause,43 Congress may enact legislation that super-
sedes state or local laws.t" In addition, a federal agency, acting within the scope
of its delegated authority, may preempt state or local law." Furthermore, state
common-law doctrines may also be preempted by federal law." Preemption can
arise in various ways."? For example, express preemption occurs when a federal
statute specifically excludes state regulation in a particular area." State law is
also preempted when the federal government occupies a regulatory field. Fed-
eral occupation of a field may be based on the existence of a dominant federal
interest". or on the existence of a pervasive scheme of federal regulation. 50
Finally, state law will be preempted where there is a direct conflict between state
and federal law. A conflict may occur when state law requires a person to do
something that federal law forbids.'! State law may also conflict with federal
42• See Comment, Tobacco Under Fire: Developments in Judicial Responses to Cigarette
Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 643, 655 (1987) (§I334 bars states from directly regulat-
ing cigarette packaging and advertising).
43. U.S. CONST. Art. VI, § 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in ev-
ery State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding."
44- E.g .• see Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (federal statute pre-
empted state law regulating issuance of securities by natural gas pipeline companies); Burbank v.
Lockheod Air Terminal, Inc., 41 I U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (municipal airport curfew ordinance pre-
empted by FAA regulations).
45. Bg., see Captiol Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S.
663, 667-68 (1962) (treasury regulations).
46. E.g., see International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,487 (1987) (federal statute
preempts nuisance actions against out-of-state defendants); Chicago & North Western Transp. Co.
v. Kala Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (federal statute preempts tort claim based on
abandonment of service).
47. See Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and Alternative Com-
pensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSEL. REV. 897, 913-24 (1988).
48. E.g., see Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85. 108 (1983) (ERISA benefits); Fidel-
ity Federal Savings & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982) (banking regulations).
49. E.g., see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1971) (preempting state welfare
eligibility requirements that discriminated against aliens); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-
41 (1968) (preempting state probate laws that discriminated against citizens of communist countries).
50. E.g., see Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (preempting state
law regulating financing of natural gas pipelines because of pervasive federal energy regulation);
Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Railway & Motor Coach Employees of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S .
. 274, 296 (1971) (preempting state-law wrongful discharge claim because of pervasive federal labor
legislation).
51. E.g., see McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115. 137 (1913).
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regulatory policies by impairing the exercise of rights created by federal law. 52
Finally, a state law will be preempted if it frustrates federal regulatory goals."
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone, most courts found that sec-
tion 1334 did not expressly preempt actions under state tort law because they felt
that terms like "prohibition" and "requirement," used in that section, could only
refer to direct coercion by the state. 54 Furthermore, most courts refused to pre-
empt state law tort claims on "occupation of the field" grounds either. 55 Virtu-
ally every court that has preempted state tort claims has done so on actual conflict
grounds. In many cases, these courts have found a conflict on the basis that
allowance of tort claims against tobacco companies would upset a "balance,"
reflected in the Act, between health concerns and commercial interests. 56
The Cipollone Decision
Overview
The Cipollone saga began in 1983, when Rose Cipollone and her husband
brought a tort action against the respondent tobacco companies to recover dam-
ages for smoking-related injuries. When Rose Cipollone died of lung cancer in
1984, her husband filed an amended complaint and continued the action. When
he died, their son, in his capacity as executor, continued to press the suit." The
amended complaint alleged that the cigarettes were defective because the defen-
dants failed to use a safer alternative design for their products and because the
harm caused by smoking out-weighed the social value of cigarettes. 58 The com-
plaint also stated that the defendants failed to provide adequate warnings about
the health consequences of smoking and that they negligently tested, researched,
52. E.g., see McCarty v. Mcrony, 453 U.S. 210, 235 (1981) (preempting state law that con-
flicted with federal life insurance contract for military personnel); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439
U.S. 572, 585 (1979) (holding federal railroad retirement benefits not subject to state law claims
of divorced spouse).
53. E.g., see International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,494 (1987) (preempting nui-
sance claim for water pollution against out-of-state permittee); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n,
Inv., v. Agric. Marketing & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (preempting state agricul-
tural commodity marketing scheme).
54. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625 (1StCit, 1987), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 838 (1989); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (D.N.J. 1984); Forster
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. 1989); Carlisle v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
805 S.W.2ct 498, 509 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
55. See Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. Iql, 1176 (D. Mass. 1986); Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1164 (D.N.J. 1984); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 577 Avad 1239, 1247 (N.J. 1990).
56. See Pennington v. Vistron Corp., 876 F.2d 414, 421 (5th Cir. 1989); Roysdon v. R.J. Reyn-
olds Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230,234 (6th Cir. 1988); Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620,
626 (r st Cir. 1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987); Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417, 419 (Pa. Super.
1990); Phillips v. R.J. Reynolds Industries, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).
57. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2614.
58. [d. The Court referred to these allegations as "design defect claims." Id.
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sold, promoted, and advertised their products." In addition, the complaint
declared that the defendants had expressly warranted that their products were
not dangerous to the health of consumers.P" Furthermore, the complaint
claimed that the defendants, through their advertising, had attempted to neutral-
ize the effect of the federally mandated warning, and that they had ignored or
failed to act upon medical evidence, known to them, about the health risks of
smoking." Finally, the complaint charged that the defendants conspired to
deprive the public of data on the health effects of smoking.F
The defendant cigarette manufacturers maintained that the federal labeling
statute preempted all of these claims. In a pretrial ruling, the trial court rejected
the preemption defense.F' However, the defendants brought an interlocutory
appeal and succeeded in having the trial court's ruling reversed.P' On remand,
the trial court determined that the failure to warn, express warranty, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and conspiracy to defraud claims were all preempted to
the extent that they relied on advertising or promotional activities after the ef-
fective date of the Act. 65 The trial court also ruled that design defect claims,
though not preempted, were not allowed under state law.66
At trial, the jury rejected the fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to
defraud claims, but found that the defendants had breached their duty to warn
and express warranties prior to the Act's effective date." Nevertheless, the jury
refused to award damages to Rose Cipollone's estate because it concluded she
had voluntarily and unreasonably encountered a known danger by smoking cig-
arettes." However, the jury awarded $400,000 to the decedent's husband to
compensate him for losses caused by the defendants' breach of express war-
rarity." Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
preemption ruling, but ordered a new trial on other issues."? At that point, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari." The resulting decision in Cipollone
reflected a bitter division within the Court on the issue of federal preemption of
common-law damage claims.
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
O'Connor, wrote the plurality opinion in Cipollone." Justice Stevens declared
that preemptive language in federal statutes should be narrowly construed."
59. Id. The Court described these allegations as "failure to warn" claims. Id.
60. Id. The Court characterized these allegations as "express warranty" claims. ld.
61. ld. The Court identified these allegations as the "fraudulent misrepresentation" claims. [d.
62. [d. The Court referred to these allegations as "conspiracy to defraud" claims. Id.
63. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (D.N.I. 1984)·
64. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986).
65. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 664, 669 (D.N.]. 1986).
66. [d. at 669-72.
67. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 208, 222-23 (D.N.J. 1988).
68. [d.
69. [d.
70. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 582 (3d Cir 1990).
71. See Cipollone v, Liggett Group, Inc., I I I S. Ct. 1386 (1991).
72. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2613-25.
73. [d. at 2618.
With that principle in mind, Justice Stevens found that the 1965Act's preemp-
tion provision prohibited state and federal rulemaking bodies from mandating
particular warning language, but did not bar damage claims based on principles
of state tort law." However, Justice Stevens also determined that the broader
language of the 1969 Act's preemption provision was sufficient to prohibit fail-
ure to warn claims arising from conduct after that date." At the same time,
Justice Stevens concluded that the 1969 Act did not preempt express warranty
claims, fraudulent misrepresentation claims, or conspiracy to defraud claims."
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, concurred in part
and dissented in part." Justice Blackmun believed that there was no difference
in congressional intent between the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act.78 He reasoned
that if the preemption provision in the 1965Act did not bar common-law dam-
age actions for failure to warn, then the 1969 Act could not do so either, even
though Congress had modified the language of the Act's preemption provision
slightly." Accordingly, Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's decision that
Cipollone's express warranty, misrepresentation, and conspiracy claims should
be allowed, but dissented from the Court's decision to preempt the failure to warn
claims."
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, also concurred in part and dissented
in part." Justice Scalia vigorously objected to the theory of statutory construc-
tion proposed by Justice Stevens. According to Justice Scalia, preemptive lan-
guage in statutes should not be construed either narrowly or broadly, but in
accordance with its ordinary meaning." On that basis, Justice Scalia concluded
that both the 1965Act and the 1969 Act preempted all of Cipollone's claims."
Accordingly, Justice Scalia concurred in the Court's decision to bar post-1969
failure to warn claims, but dissented from its decision to allow pre-1969 failure
to warn claims and post-1969 express warranty, misrepresentation, and conspir-
acy claims."
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Theories of Statutory Interpretation in Cipollone
Justice Stevens proposed two rules of statutory construction to limit the pre-
emptive effect of federal legislation. First, he declared that implied preemption
74- Id. at 2619.
75- ld. at 2621-22.
76. [d. at 2623 (express warranty claim); id, at 2624 (fraudulent misrepresentation claims); id.
at 2624-25 (conspiracy to defraud claims).
77. [d. at 2625-32.
78. [d. at 2629.
79. [d. at 2629-3°.
80. [d. at 263 I.
81. [d. at 2632-38.
82. [d. at 2632.
83- Id. at 2635 (pre-196s claims); id. at 2635 (post-1969 express warranty claim); id. at 2637
(post-I969 misrepresentation and conspiracy claims).
84. [d. at 2637.
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theories should not be used in cases where Congress had included an express
preemption provision in the statute." In addition, Justice Stevens stated that
preempIion provisions in statutes should be interpreted narrowly." Justice Sca-
lia rejected both of these proposals, and argued for a more expansive interpre-
tation of preemptive language."
The first rule of construction was based on the notion thai the enactment of
a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond
that reach are not preempted." Since no other provisions were concerned with
the Acts' preemptive scope, Justice Stevens limited himself to an examination of
the text of section 5 of each statute.t" Justice Blackmun agreed with this
approach, declaring that the Court should only resort to principles of implied
preemption when Congress has been silent with respect to preemption.?"
Justice Scalia acknowledged that this rule of construction was correct as far
as occupation of the field was concerned. In such cases, the existence of a
preemption provision in the statute would indicate that Congress did not intend
for the statute to reach beyond its stated regulatory limits." However, Justice
Scalia maintained that the rule against implied preemption should not apply to
direct conflict cases." In his view, such a rule would prevent federal courts
from preempting state action that undermined federal regulatory policy in cases
where Congress failed to anticipate a conflict."
Justice Stevens also declared in Cipollone that the Court should narrowly con-
strue statutory preemption provisions. This narrow construction or "clear mean-
ing" rule was derived from the presumption against preemption, a principle that
the Court has recognized for many years!' Justice Scalia, however, argued that
the Court should interpret preemptive provisions "neither narrowly, nor broadly,
but in accordance with their apparent meaning."" According to Justice Scalia,
the presumption against preemption was more appropriate in implied preemp-
tion cases; where congressional intent to preempt was clear, the Court should
employ ordinary principles of statutory construction to interpret a statute's pre-
emptive language!'
85. Id. at 2618.
86. Ed.
87. !d. at 2633-34.
88. [d. at 2618. Justice Stevens characterized this as a variant of the principle expressio unius
est exclusio alterius. [d.
89. !d.
90. [d. at 2625.
91. ld. at 2633.
92. Ed. at 2633.
93. Ed. at 2633.
94. [d. at 2617-18. The presumption against preemption provides that the preemption doctrine
shall not be applied unless Congress manifests a clear intent to displace state law. See Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725. 746 (1981); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981); Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (I947)·
95. ld. at 2632.
96. Ed.
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Resolution of Preemption Issues in Cipollone
The Distinction Between the 1965 Act and the 1969 Act
Justice Stevens believed that there was a significant difference between the
preemptive language of the 1965 Act and that of the 1969 Act.97 Section S(b) of
the 1965 Act provided, "No statement relating to smoking and health shall be
required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled
in conformity with the provisions of this Act."98 According to Justice Stevens,
this provision was quite narrow in scope and did not preempt damage claims
under state tort law principles."? The 1969 Act replaced this language with a
provision that declared, "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or pro-
motion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with
the provisions of this Act." 100 Justice Stevens contended that this change in sec-
tion S(b) expanded the Act's preemptive reach.'?' In particular, he pointed out
that requirements and prohibitions were broader concepts than statements, and
that the scope of section S(b) was extended to include promotional activities as
well as advertising."?
Both Justice Scalia and Justice Blackmun maintained that the changes in the
1969 Act did not affect its preemptive scope. Justice Scalia based his argument
on a consistency rationale. He claimed that Justice Stevens had construed the
phrase "no statement relating to smoking and health shall be required" in the
1965 Act to mean no particular statement relating to smoking and health could
be required by the states.'?' Since duties imposed under common law did not
require cigarette companies to include any particular statement in their adver-
tising, but merely required them to provide adequate warnings about the health
risks of smoking, Justice Stevens was able to conclude that section S(b) of the
1965 Act did not preempt failure to warn claims. 104 If this was so, Justice Sca-
lia reasoned, section S(b) of the 1969 Act also should have been construed to
mean merely that state law could not impose a specific advertising requirement
based on smoking and health.!" Thus, under this approach, section S(b) would
have allowed general, "noncigarette-specific duties" to be imposed upon cigarette
manufacturers by state tort law. 106
Justice Blackmun, on the other hand, relied on an examination of legislative
history to conclude that section S(b) of the 1969 Act, though textually different
from its 1965 predecessor, was no different substantively. He quoted from a Sen-
97. Id. at 2619_
98. Pub. L. No. 89-92, §5tb) (1965).
99- Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618.
roo. Pub. L. No. 91-222, §5tb) (1969).
101. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2619_
102. [d.
r03_ [d. at 2634-
104. ld.
IOj. [d. at 2635_
106. [d. at 2634-35-
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ate Report that stated that the changes in section 5(b) were mere clarifications
of the existing preemption provision.'?' According to Justice Blackmun, the
purpose of these changes was to make it clear that states could not do through
prohibitory action that which the 1965 Act already banned through mandatory
action.':" In addition, portions of the Act's legislative history indicated that
Congress was concerned with the effect of positive enactments, and not with the
effect of common-law tort doctrines.l'"
Justice Blackmun also observed that Congress made no change in the state-
ment of purpose provision when it amended the 1965 Act in 1969.110If the lan-
guage in the 1965 Act indicated that Congress was solely concerned with state
legislative and administrative requirements, I II then its failure to change this lan-
guage in 1969 suggested that Congress was still only concerned with positive
enactments and did not intend to enlarge the scope of the 1969 Act's preemp-
tion provision. 112 Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that nothing in the Act's
legislative history suggested that Congress intended to deprive injured consum-
ers of their existing remedies under state law when it amended the Act in
1969.113 According to Justice Blackmun, Congress rarely abolished existing
state remedies without replacing them with comparable substitutes under federal
law; therefore, it was unlikely that Congress meant to do so in 1969.11'
Frankly, it is hard to see any difference between the 1965 Act and the 1969
Act as far as preemption is concerned. None of the lower federal courts had
observed any such distinction. The distinction seems to be of little practical
importance anyway, since it merely adds four years to the period for which cig-
arette manufacturers may be liable on a failure to warn basis. As a practical mat-
ter, it is unlikely that plaintiffs who smoked before 1969and continued to smoke
for some period of time after that date will be able to provide a realistic formula
for apportioning injuries caused by pre-1969 conduct and those caused by post-
1969 conduct.
The Meaning of "Requirement or Prohibition Imposed Under State Law"
Having decided that the 1969 Act's preemptive language was broader than
that :of the 1965 Act, the Court then had to determine whether the 1969 Act
expressly preempted some or all common-law damage actions against tobacco
companies. Section 5(b) barred any "requirement or prohibition, based on smok-
ing and health" that was "imposed under State law." There was general agree-
ment that the phrase "requirement or prohibition ... imposed under State Law"
was broad enough to include obligations or duties imposed by common-law tort
107. ld. at 2629, quoting from Sen. Rep. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1St Sess. 12 (1969).
108. Cipollone, [12 S. Ct. at 2629.
10.9. Id. at 2629~30 (citing Sen. Rep. No. 566, qr st Cong., 1St Sess. 12 (1969».
I ro. Jd. at 2630.
I I I. Id. at 2630.
112. [d. at 2630.
113. [d.
114. ld.
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principles.!" However, the justices could not agree on whether Congress had
such common-law duties in mind when referred to requirements and prohibitions
in section S(b).
Justice Stevens conceded that Congress was primarily concerned with posi-
tive enactments by state and local governments, but he also declared that there
was no reason to assume that Congress intended to exclude any particular type
of state regulatory action from the sweep of section S(b), as long as it fell within
the definition of "regulation or prohibition." 116 Justice Stevens also relied on
the Act's legislative history to support an expansive reading of section S(b). He
pointed out that when section S(b) was revised in 1969, a Conference Commit-
tee changed the words "any State statute or regulation" to "State law," indicat-
ing a desire to extend the reach of section S(b) to common-law rules."? For
these reasons, Justice Stevens concluded that Congress intended to preempt any
common-law rule that had a regulatory effect on cigarette labeling. "'
Justice Blackmun argued that the term "requirement or prohibition imposed
under State law" was ambiguous. 119 He observed that the dictionary definition
of "requirement" and "prohibition" suggested specific actions mandated or dis-
allowed by a formal governing authority and did not include duties imposed by
common-law doctrines.!" Moreover, Justice Blackmun attached great signifi-
cance to the fact that common-law damage actions did not exert the same sort
of influence on products manufacturers as statutory or administrative regula-
tions.!" Relying on Goodyear Atomic Corporation v. Miller,122 a recent deci-
sion, Justice Blackmun declared that a product manufacturer could meet its
common-law duty to warn in a variety of ways, including payment of damage
awards.!" According to Justice Blackmun, the availability of such choices dis-
tinguished common-law duties from those imposed positive enactments:
The level of choice that a defendant retains in shaping its own behavior dis-
tinguishes the indirect regulatory effect of the common law from positive
enactments such as statutes and administrative regulations.'?"
1I5. ld. at 2620; id. at 2627; id. at 2634.
I r6. [d. at 2620.
117. [d. at 2621.
118. Id. Justice Scalia also agreed that Congress intended the phrase "requirement and pro-
hibition imposed under state law" to preempt damage claims based on breach of common-law duties.
[d. at 2634.
119. [d. at 2627·
120. Jd.
121. [d. at 2627.
122. 486 U.S. 174. 185-86 (1988) (finding no preemption because the company could disre-
gard state safety regulations and elect to pay a workers compensation claim if an employee was
injured as a result of a safety violation). See also Silkwood v. Kerr-Me/lee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
256 (1984) (upholding a state punitive damage award despite incidental regulatory effect).
123. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2628.
124. [d.
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Justice Blackmun also observed that tort law was different from positive regu-
latory enactments because it had an entirely different function - that of compen-
sating injured partiesY'
Justice Blackmun seems to have had the better of the argument on this issue.
First of all, common-law rules regulate only indirectly and leave the regulated
party with a great deal of flexibility. 126 Consequently, common-law rules usu-
ally present less of an impediment to federal regulation than positive enactments
like statutes and administrative regulations.I2? Furthermore, the Court has rec-
ognized this fact on a number of occasions by finding positive enactments to be
preempted, but not common law rules.!" In addition, there were virtually no
references to common-law damage awards in the Act's legislative history, sug-
gesting that Congress was not concerned about the possible regulatory effects
of such awards. 129 In contrast, there are numerous references in the act's legis-
lative history about the undesirable effects of state or local mandatory labeling
requirements. 1)0 Finally, it is unlikely that Congress would destroy existing rem-
edies by implication, instead of doing so expressly.':" Thus, it is remarkable
that the Court found a congressional intent to preempt common-law damage
claims, particularly in light of the "clear meaning" rule that was supposed to apply
in express preemption cases.
Preemption of Specific Claims
Justice Blackmun would have allowed all of Cipollone's claims. Justice Scalia
would have preempted all of these claims. However, Justice Stevens, writing for
125. /d.
126. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 68-129 (1970) (discussing the difference be-
tween general deterrence and specific deterrence regimes).
127. See Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public Policy and Alternative
Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 926-27 (1988).
128. See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 86 (1990) (claim for emotional distress
not preempted); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1988) (workers compen-
sation claim not preempted); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (punitive
damage claim not preempted). It is also significant that Congress expressly preserved common law
remedies when it enacted the Comprehensive smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986,
a labeling act that closely resembles the 1969 Act in structure and purpose. See 15 U.S.c. §4406(C)
(Supp. 1991).
129. See Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability; Preemption, Public Policy and Alternative
Compensation Systems, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 925 (1988).
130. See SEN. REP. No. 566, 9ISt Cong., rst Sess. 12, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONGo &
ADMIN. NEWS 2652, 2663 (section 5(b) intended to cover not only state statutes, but administra-
tive regulations and local ordinances); Hearings on H.R. 643, 1237,3°55,6543 Before the House
Committee on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 9ISt Cong., r st Sess. 16 (statement of Rep. Per-
kins); id. at 30(statement of Rep. Fountain); id. at 554 (1969) (statement of Joseph F. Cullman, III).
131. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984) ("it is difficult to believe
that Congress would, without comment, remove aU means of judicial recourse for those injured
by illegal conduct"); Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1251 (N.J. 1990)
("We are convinced that had Congress intended to immunize cigarette manufacturers from pack-
Failure to Warn Claims. The plaintiff in Cipollone claimed that the defen-
dant cigarette companies were negligent in the manner in which they tested,
researched, sold, promoted, and advertised their products.F? In addition, it was
alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate warnings of the health con-
sequences of smoking.P" Since the common-law duty to warn was a state law
"requirement with respect to advertising or promotion," Justice Stevens concluded
that any claim based on breach of such a duty after 1969 would be preempted
to the extent that it penalized the defendants for failing to provide additional,
or more specific, warnings than those required by the Act. 134 On the other hand,
claims based on inadequate testing or research presumably would not be pre-
empted since they were not related to advertising or promotional activities.!"
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the majority, preempted only the plaintiff's post-1969 failure to warn claims, and
allowed the others to stand.
The Express Warranty Claim. The plaintiff also contended that the defen-
dant cigarette companies breached an express warranty.!" Liability was based
on assurances in the defendants' advertising that cigarettes did not present any
serious health risks to smokers.!" According to Justice Stevens, the appropri-
ate inquiry for the Court was not whether a claim challenged the propriety of
advertising or promotion, but whether the source of the duty upon which the
claim was based constituted a state law requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health with respect to advertising or promotion. 138 Justice Stevens
reasoned that duties under the law of express warranty arose from, and were mea-
sured by, the terms of the warranty. Therefore, a common-law remedy for breach
of a voluntary contractual commitment would not be regarded as a requirement
imposed under state law. 139 Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded, the plain-
tiff could maintain an action for breach of express warranty, regardless of how
the warranty was communicated.r'"
Justice Scalia strongly disagreed with this analysis. He argued that back-
ground legal principles (in this case the law of express warranty), not the actor's
voluntary conduct, supplied the element of legal obligation. ,., He also pointed
aging, labeling, misrepresentation, and warning claims, it knew how to do so with unmistakable
specificity. "}.
132. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621.
133. [d.
134. [d. at 262 I -22.
135. [d. at 2622.
136. Jd. Express warranties in New Jersey were governed by section 2-313 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §r2A:2-3I3(1)(a) (West 1991).
137. Id. See also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541,574.576 (3d Cir. 1990); Cipol-
lone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1497 (D.N.J. 1988).
'38. [d.
'39. [d.
140. ld. at 2622-23.
I41. [d. at 2635-
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out that the Court had recently rejected Justice Stevens's rationale in Norfolk
& Western Railroad v. American Train Dispatchers Association,l42 where it
construed an exemption from antitrust laws "and from all other law" to include
an exemption from contract obligations.!" Consequently, Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the plaintiff's express warranty claim, since it was based on state-
ments made in advertising, should have been preempted. 144
Fraudulent Misrepresentation Claims. The plaintiff set forth two theories of
fraudulent misrepresentation: First, he claimed that the defendants, through their
advertising, neutralized the effect of the federally mandated warnings; second,
he alleged that the defendants falsely represented that smoking was safe, and they
failed to disclose evidence in their possession that smoking was harrnful.!" Jus-
tice Stevens determined that the first claim was preempted because it was the con-
verse of Cipollone's failure to warn claim, which the Court had already held to
be preemptecl.!" However, he concluded that the second claim was not prohib-
ited by section S(b). First of all, because section S(b) only preempted state require-
ments with respect to advertising or promotion, Justice Stevens declared that no
claim would be barred that required the defendants to disclose material facts
through other channels of communication. 14' Moreover, Justice Stevens stated
that even claims arising from statements in advertising would not be preempted,
because they were not predicated on a duty related to smoking and health, but
rather arose from a more general duty not to deceive.':"
Justice Scalia chided Justice Stevens for not applying his analysis consis-
tently.!" Justice Scalia declared that both the duty to warn and the duty not to
deceive were general obligations, and neither was specifically concerned with
smoking and health. Therefore, if fraudulent misrepresentation claims based on
false advertising were not preempted, then failure to warn claims should not be
preempted either.!" According to Justice Scalia, the Court should not have
focused on the ultimate source of the duty, but on its proximate application. 151
Thus, whether the duty arose from statute, administrative regulation, or some
general principle of common law, it would fall within the purview of section S(b)
if it imposed on obligation on cigarette companies with respect to smoking and
health. 152 Under this approach, Justice Scalia concluded, both of the plaintiff's
fraudulent misrepresentation claims would be preernpted.!"
142. I I I S. Ct. at 1164.
143. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2636.
'44. ld.
145. [d. at 2623-24.
146. [d. at 2623.
147. ld.
148. [d. at 2624.
149. ld. at 2636.
150. Jd.
151. [d.
152. ld. at 2637.
'53. ld.
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lustice Stevens acknowledged that there was some merit to lustice Scalia's
criticism, but maintained that his approach came closest to carrying out the intent
of Congress.'>' According to lustice Stevens, to analyze fraudulent misrepre-
sentation claims at the lowest level of generality, as lustice Scalia recommended,
would result in a broad interpretation of section S(b) that was contrary to a con-
gressional intent that the states retain some power in this area. 155
ConspiracyClaims. Finally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants had con-
spired to misrepresent or conceal material facts concerning the health risks of
smoking.!" lustice Stevens declared that these claims were based on a general
duty under state law not to conspire to commit fraud, and not only any state
requirement based on smoking and health.!'? Therefore, he concluded that
these claims were not preempted by section S(b).I58
An Assessment of the Cipollone Decision
It is obvious from Cipollone that the Court is strongly divided over the scope
of federal preemption in the products liability area. Only three other justices com-
pletely agreed with lustice Stevens's analysis. Two other justices joined with Jus-
tice Blackmun in concluding that none of the plaintiff's claims should have been
preempted, while one other justice agreed with lustice Scalia that all of the plain-
tiff's claims should have been preempted.
One point that everyone agreed upon was that Cipollone should be treated
as an express preemption case. This is somewhat surprising in light of the fact
that most courts have rejected an express preemption analysis. IS' However, an
express preemption analysis is desirable to the extent that it induces the Court
to start with the statutory text when seeking an answer to preemption ques-
tions."? Ordinarily, it should not be necessary for the Court to engage in an
implied preemption analysis if the express preemption provision is clear. An
exception to this approach might be made in cases where a conflict between state
and federal law occurs that was obviously not foreseen by Congress when it
enacted the statute."?'
Most of the justices also agreed that the Court should not find preemption
unless supported by the "clear meaning" of the statutory text. Unfortunately, the
'54· Id. at 2624 n. 27.
155. !d.
156. Id. at 2624.
'57. !d.
IS8. ld. at 2624-25.
[59· E.g., see Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 625 (1St Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 838 (1989); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1I46, II55 (D.N.J. (984);
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655. 658 (Minn. 1989); Carlisle v. Philip Mor-
ris, Inc., 805 S.W.2d 498, 509 (Tex. Ct. App. 199')'
160. See Eskridge, Jr., & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 321, 340 (1990) (arguing that one should start with the text first when interpreting a statute).
16r. Cipollone, r 12 S. Ct. at 2633-34.
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justices could not seem to agree on whether the language of section 5(b) satis-
fied this requirement. Since the text of section 59b) was ambiguous, one would
have expected the Court to have rejected the preemption argument if it was seri-
ous about employing a "clear meaning" approach.
Perhaps the greatest area of disagreement within the Court was over the
proper treatment of general principles of state law. Justice Blackmun, applying
a high level of generality, maintained that any duty based on state common law
should be excluded from preemption unless the duty itself was confined to adver-
tising with respect to smoking and health. This approach would have exempted vir-
tually every tort-based duty from the reach of section 5(b). Justice Scalia, on the
other hand, chose to focus exclusively on the effect of a common law duty on adver-
tising with respect to smoking and health. This approach would have extended the
Act's preemptive scope to almost all advertising with respect to smoking and health.
Justice Stevens steered a middle course between these two extremes, but his ap-
proach was conceptually flawed. As a consequence, the outcome of Cipollone is
likely to strike most legal scholars as profoundly unsatisfactory.
For better or for worse, Cipollone leaves the door open for future litigation
against cigarette companies. Presumably, injured parties will continue to bring
actions based on express warranty, misrepresentation, and conspiracy theories.
However, it remains to be seen whether any of these theories will prove
successful.
Express warranty does not appear to be a very attractive theory. To recover
under express warranty, the plaintiff must show that the defendant made a spe-
cific representation about product quality or safety, and that the plaintiff relied
on this representation. I" As late as the mid-I950S, some cigarette advertise-
ments explicitly claimed that smoking was safe; 163 however, since that time rep-
resentations of safety have become more subtle.l'" Consequently, it may be
difficult for an injured consumer to establish that the subliminal assurances of
safety often found in current cigarette advertising should be treated as express
warranties. 165
Fraudulent misrepresentation looks more promising. The first theory discussed
in Cipollone appears to have been based on a manufacturer's duty to disclose
known health risks associated with its product. There is no doubt that cigarette
companies, despite growing scientific evidence of the health risks of smoking,
failed to disclose any of these risks until required to do so by federal legisla-
162. See Comment, Product Defects Resulting in Pure Economic Loss: Under What Theory
Can a Consumer Recover?, 50 Mo. L. REV. 625. 629 (1986).
163. See Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?, 29
ARIz. L. REV. 195. 237 (1987).
164. For example, many advertisements feature young, attractive smokers engaging in sports
or other physical activities, thereby suggesting that smoking does not impair one's health. See Note,
Constitutional Realism: Legislative Bans on Tobacco Advertisements and the First Amendment,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1193, 1207.
165. But see Levin, The Liability of Tobacco Companies-Should Their Ashes Be Kicked?,
29 ARIZ. L. REV. 195.239-41 (1987) (arguing that current advertising does give rise to an express
warranty.that cigarettes are safe).
tion.!" The only question is whether very many states would recognize a cause
of action, independent of the duty to warn in products liability, for failure to
disclose health risks in some manner other than by advertising or product
labeling.
The other theory of fraudulent misrepresentation discussed in Cipollone
involved false representation and concealment of material facts. In the case of
affirmative misrepresentations, the defendant must make a false statement of
material fact, and the plaintiff must detrimentally rely on this statement. Thus,
as in express warranty, plaintiffs would have to establish that cigarette adver-
tising contained factual misstatements. In addition, plaintiffs would have to prove
that they continued to smoke in reliance upon these false statements. The con-
cealment theory is potentially more advantageous to plaintiffs. There is evidence
that cigarette companies have used their economic power to discourage negative
media coverage of smoking-related health issues. i67 If this practice is wide-
spread, it might provide the basis for a fraudulent concealment claim.
The final theory approved by the Court in Cipollone was conspiracy to mis-
represent or conceal material facts. This theory is similar to fraudulent misrep-
resentation, but would require the plaintiff also to prove collective action by
tobacco companies. The tobacco industry is highly concentrated and oligopolis-
tic in character, and tends to act cooperatively in response to common prob-
lerns.!" Of course, plaintiffs would have to prove the existence of a conspiracy
within the industry to conceal or misrepresent material facts about health and
smoking. However, the experience of the asbestos industry indicates that con-
spiracies of this sort do occur .i69 Since the industry generally acts through its
trade association, the Tobacco Institute, an inquiry into the actions of this orga-
nization might yield evidence of a conspiracy. i70
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r66. See Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Lia-
bility in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1096 (1990).
167. See Note. The Great American Smokeout: Holding Cigarette Manufacturers Liable/or
Failing to Provide Adequate Warnings of the Hazards of Smoking, 27 B.C.L. REV. 1033, 1068
(1986).
168. See Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alternative to Strict Lia-
bility in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085. 1111 (1990).
169- Sumner Simpson, the president of Raybestos, an asbestos supplier, intervened on several
occasions in the 19305 and 1940S to prevent publication in the industry's trade journal of articles
about asbestosis. He informed Vandiver Brown, an officer of Johns-Manville, of his intention and
on each occasion received Brown's full support. Hansen v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., see 734
F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1°51 (1985) (discussing the Sumner Simp-
son letters); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 530 {yth Cir. 1984) (same); Fischer
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 472 A.2d 577, 580 (N.J. 1984) (same).
170. For example, the Tobacco Institute has characterized as "biased" and "nonscientific" med-
ical studies that reveal the health risks of smoking. See THE SMOKINGCONTROVERSY:A PERSPEC-
TIVE,A STATEMENTBYTHETOBACCOINSTITUTE(December 1978) (cited in P. TAYLOR,THE SMOKE
RING:TOBACCO,MONEY,AND MULTINATIONALPOLITICS11-12 (1984)). In addition, the Council on
Tobacco Research. an organization funded by tobacco companies, has conducted experiments
designed to cast doubts on the link between cigarette smoking and cancer. See Comment, Strict
Products Liability on the Move: Cigarette Manufacturers May Soon Feel the Heat, 23 SANDIEGO
L. REV. 1137. 1142 (1986).
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The Impact of Cipollone on Other Preemption Controversies
The preemption issue has not been limited to cigarettes; over the past few
years, it has been raised in connection with motor vehicles, pesticides, vaccines,
and medical devices. The potential effect of Cipollone in each of these areas will
be discussed below. Three aspects of that decision arguably provide some guid-
ance for future litigation. First, the Court seems to prefer to base its decision
on express preemption when the statute in question contains a preemption pro-
vision. Second, the Court purports to apply a "clear meaning" rule of statutory
interpretation in preemption cases, although it is questionable whether such a rule
was actually applied in Cipollone. Third, the Court appears to believe that state
product liability doctrines are just as coercive as statutes or administrative reg-
ulations. Finally, policy concerns, such as federalism, fairness, economic effi-
ciency, and risk distribution, are not likely to have much impact on the Court's
decision making in preemption cases.
Motor Vehicles
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act!" authorizes the Department of
Transportation to promulgate federal motor vehicle safety standards (FMVSS).172
The Act contains a preemption provision that prohibits nonidentical state reg-
ulation when a federal safety standard deals with the same aspect of perfor-
mance.!" However, the Act also contains a "savings clause" that purports to
preserve common-law remedies against automobile manuracturers.!"
In recent years, there has been a considerable amount of litigation over the
preemptive effect of FMVSS 208, a federal safety standard that specifies equip-
ment requirements for motor vehicle occupant restraint systems. 175FMVSS 208
allows automobile manufacturers to comply by installing airbags or by instal-
ling various combinations of lapbelts and shoulder harnesses. 176 Until recently,
many carmakers equipped their vehicles with seatbelts rather than airbags. Injured
consumers have sought recovery against automobile manufacturers, claiming that
they should have installed airbags in their vehicles. Most courts, however, have
determined that the federal statute preempts such clairns.!"? Only a few courts
171. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1420 (1982).
1,7" Id. §139S·
'73. Id .• § 139,(d).
'74. Id., §1397(c).
'705. 49 C.F.R. §S71.20S (1990).
176. Id., §S7I.208.S4·I.2.1-1.2·3·
177- See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (r rth Cir. 1989); Kitts v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 875 Red 787, 789 (roth Cir. 1989); Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865 F.2d
395,4'19 (1St Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1781 (1990); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co .• 714 F.
Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 532, 541-42 (E.D.
Pa. 1988); Staggs v. Chrysler Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270, 273 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Hughes v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 677 F. Supp. 76, 78 (D. Conn. 1987); Watteiet v. Toyota Motor Co., 676 F. Supp. 1039,
104' (D. Mont. '987); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (D.S.D. 1987); Baird v.
General Motors Corp., 654 F. Supp. 28, 32-33 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Cox v. Baltimore County, 646
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have reached a contrary conclusion.!" Almost no courts have found express
preemption 179 or implied preemption based on occupation of the field; I'D
instead, they have concluded that damage claims frustrate federal regulatory
objectives because they deprive automakers of the choices provided for them in
FMVSS 208. r ar
Under a Cipollone analysis, the Court would probably focus on the text of
the statute. The Act's preemption provision declares that no state may establish
or continue in effect any safety standard that is not identical to a correspond-
ing federal standard.!" However, the Act also contains a savings provision that
declares that compliance with a federal standard does not exempt one from lia-
bility under common law.183 Some courts have attempted to resolve this appar-
ent inconsistency by deciding that common-law design defect doctrines are not
safety standards.':" In light of Cipollone's broad interpretation of the terms
"requirement" and "prohibition" in the cigarette labeling act, one would not
expect the Court to agree with this analysis. Rather, the Court would probably
conclude that Congress intended to treat common-law rules as safety standards
for purposes of preemption. 185
If common-law rules are regarded as safety standards, what is the effect of
the "savings clause"? The Court might find that the savings clause merely pre-
serves common-law liability for product defects not covered by federal safety
standards.l'" However, since the Act's preemption provision purports to exempt
F. Supp. 761, 764 (D. Mo. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095. I097 (E.D. Mo.
1986); Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838. 839 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
178. See Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F. Supp. 407, 411-12 (D. Md. 1987); Murphy v. Nis-
san Motor Corp., 650 F. Supp. 922,924 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Union, A.G., 567
A.2d 312, 330 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
I79. See Cox v. Baltimore County. 646 F. Supp. 761,763 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1095, 1096-97 (E.D. Mo. 1986); Wickstrom v. Maplewood Toyota, Inc., 416
N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. '987), cerl. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2905 ('988).
180. E.g., see Garrett v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F. Supp. 407, 409 (D. Md. 1987) (rejecting
preemption based on occupation of the field). See also Miller, Deflating the Airbag Pre-emption
Controversy, 37 EMORY L.J. 897, 91 1(1988) ("[T]he language of section I392(d) demonstrates that
Congress did not mean to occupy the field of automobile safety completely. "}.
181. See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (r tth Cir. 1989); Wood v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 408 (r st Cir. 1988); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 714 F. Supp.
739,742 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp. 532, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Staggs v. Chrysler Corp., 678 F. Supp. 270, 274 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Hughes v. Ford Motor Co., 677
F. Supp. 76, 78 (D. Conn. '987); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1I83, 1I86 (D.S.D. 1987);
Baird v. General Matos Corp., 654 F. Supp. 28, 32 (N.D. Ohio 1986); Wickstrom v. Maplewood
Toyota, Inc., 4.6 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) .
r82. 15 U.S.c. § I339(d) ('982).
183. 15 U.S.C. §1397(C) ('982).
184. See Welsh v. Century Products, 745 F. Supp. 313, 319 (D. Md. 1990); Gingold v. Audi-
NSU-Auto Union, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 321 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
185. Cf. Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761, 763 (D. Md. 1986); Vanover, v. Ford
Motor Co., 632 F. Supp. 1°95, 1097 (E.D. Mo. 1986) (holding that common-law rules have the same
regulatory effect as legislatively imposed safety standards).
186. See Cox v. Baltimore County, 646 F. Supp. 761, 764 (D. Md. 1986); Wickstrom v. Maple-
wood Toyota, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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only nonidentical state standards that cover an area of performance already cov-
ered by federal regulation, this interpretation would make a savings clause unnec-
essary.!" Furthermore, there is nothing in the Act or its legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended to preempt design defect claims in every area cov-
ered by federal safety standards.!"
The peculiar history of FMVSS 208 provides another avenue for preemption
analysis.!" Unlike most administrative regulations, Congress has played a
major role in the formulation of FMVSS 208.190 Thus, the Court might plau-
sibly find that the substantive provisions of FMVSS 208 reflect a conscious and
explicit decision by Congress to allow seatbelts as an alternative to airbags. If
the Court does conclude that Congress wanted to leave automakers with a choice,
it will probably also hold that "no airbag" claims effectively deprive them of the
right to choose seatbelts in lieu of airbags.!" Thus, the Court could rule that
FMVSS administratively preempts such clalms.""
Pesticides
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) gives the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency the power to oversee most aspects of pes-
ticide development, manufacture, sale, and use."? Although the states are given
authority to regulate pesticide use to the extent that their activities do not con-
187_ See Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 824 (I rth Cir. 1989); Welsh v. Cen-
tury Products, 745 F. Supp. 313. 3I7 (D. Md. 1990); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp.
532,537 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Schwartz v. Volvo North America Corp., 554 So. ad 927, 935 (Ala. 1989)
(Hornsby, J., concurring and dissenting); Gingold v. Audi-NSU-Audi, A.G., 567 A.2d 312, 323
(Pa. Super. 1989).
188. C/. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959
(1981) (crashworthiness claim not preempted despite compliance with applicable federal safety stan-
dards); Welsh v. Century Products, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 313, 321 (D. Md. 1990) (tort claim based
on improper design of child restraint system not preempted by FMVSS 213); Garcia v. Rivera, 541
N.Y.S.2d 880, 889 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (claim based on improper height of truck bumpers not pre-
empted by federal safety standards); but see Crowe v. Fleming, 749 F. Supp. 1135, 1141 (N.D. Ga.
1990) (design defect claim based on failure to place reflective tape along sides of truck preempted
by FMVSS 108); Verna v. United States Suzuki Motor Corp., 713 F. Supp. 823, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1989)
(design defect claim based on failure to install modulating headlamp on motorcycle preempted by
FMVSS 108).
189. For a history of FMVSS 208, see Miller, Deflating the Airbag Pre-emption Controversy,
37 EMORY L.J. 897, 901-09 (1988); Wilton, Federalism Issues in "No Airbag" Tort Claims: Preemp-
tion and Reciprocal Comity, 61 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 1,3-7 (1985).
190. See Note, Preemption of Airbag Litigation: Just a Lot of Hot Air?, 76 VA. L. REV. 577,
584 n. 37 (1990).
19I. Cf. Taylor v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (nth Cir. 1989); Pokorny v. Ford
Motor Co., 714 F. Supp. 739, 742 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Kolbeck v. General Motors Corp., 702 F. Supp.
532,541 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Schick v. Chrysler Corp., 675 F. Supp. 1,83, 1186 (D.S.D. 1987); Baird
v. General Motors Corp., 654 F. Supp. 28, 32 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
192. Although most courts have reached this conclusion through a direct conflict preemption
analysis, the Court may prefer to characterize it as a form of express preemption by an adminis-
trative regulation. For a discussion of administrative preemption, see Foote, Administrative Preemp-
tion: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429 (1984).
193· 7 U.S.C. §136 (1982).
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flict with FIFRA,I94 the EPA retains exclusive control over pesticide labeling.!"
Numerous persons have brought suit against pesticide manufacturers, claiming
that EPA-approved warning labels were inadequate. As might be expected, pes-
ticide manufacturers have argued that FIFRA preempts such claims.
The majority of courts have ruled in favor of the pesticide manufacturers.F"
but a considerable minority have refused to preempt failure to warn claims."?
Virtually all courts have rejected express preemption 198and occupation of the
field 199theories, electing instead to approach the preemption issue in terms of
an actual conflict analysis. As in other preemption areas, most of these cases
have turned on whether common-law claims are considered to be a form of
regulation.i'"
Applying the Cipollone Court's preemption analysis to FIFRA, one would
start with the statute's preemption provision. This provision does not expressly
preempt common-law claims; rather, it prohibits state law "requirements" incon-
sistent with federal safety standards.?" FIFRA's legislative history is also silent
on the question of whether Congress intended to preempt state law failure to warn
claims.202 Nevertheless, the Court, if it chose, could argue that FIFRA expressly
preempts failure to warn claims because they rely on a state requirement with
respect to labeling that differs from the requirement imposed by the EPA.'O)
194. Id. at §136v(a).
195. [d. at §136v(b).
196. See Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers. Inc., 959 F.2d 158, 164
(roth Cir. 1992); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 927 F.2d 1019, 1025 (I t th Cir. 1991); Kennan v. Dow Chem-
ical Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 811 (M.D. Fla. 1989); Fisher v. Chevron Chemicai Co., 716 F. Supp.
1283, 1289 (w.D. Mo. 1989); Fitzgerald v. Matlinckrodt, 681 F. Supp. 404, 407 (E.n. Mich. 1987);
Begley v. Truly Nolan Exterminators, Inc., 573 So. ad 1038, 1039 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991).
197. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co .. 736 F.2d 1529, 1542-43 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984); Cox v. Velsicol Chemical Co., 704 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Rob-
erts v. Dow Chemical Co., 702 F. Supp. 195, 199 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
198. But see Keenan v. Dow Chemical Co., 717 F. Supp. 799, 805 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (conclud-
ing that FIFRA expressly preempts failure to warn claims).
199. But see Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1025 (r rth Cir. 1991) (holding that the fed-
eral government had occupied the entire field of pesticide labeling regulation).
200. Cj. Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, I541 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Cox v. Vel-
sicol Chemical Corp., 704 F. Supp. 85. 87 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Roberts v. Dow Chemical Co., 702 F.
Supp. 195. 197 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (common-law rules do not have a regulatory effect) with Arkan-
sas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158. 162-63 (roth Cir. 1992);
Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1026 (r rth Cit. 1991) (common-law rules are coercive and
thus have a regulatory effect).
20r. '5 U.S.C. §136v(b) (1982).
202. One House committee report declared that "In dividing the responsibility between States
and the Federal Government for the management of an effective pesticide program, the Commit-
tee has adopted language which is intended to completely preempt State authority in regard to label-
ing and packaging." See H.R. REP. No. 92~511, cand Cong .. t st Sess. 16 (1971). However, two
Senate reports on FlFRA merely paraphrase section 136v(b), and do not discuss its potential ef-
fect on failure to warn claims. See SEN. REP. No. 92-838, qand Cong., ad Sess. (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3993, 4021; SEN. REP. 92-97°, 9211d Cong., ad Sess.
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4092, 4128.
203. Cj. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2621.
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Drugs and Medical Devices
PursuanI to authority delegated to it by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act"J4 and the Public Health Service Act,205 the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) supervises the manufacture and marketing of most pharmaceutical prod-
uctS.206In the past decade, there has been a good deal of litigation over phar-
maceutical design and labeling. However, notwithstanding the pervasive nature
of FDA regulation, most courts have not responded favorably to preemption
arguments.j'"
DPT Vaccine
A large number of preemption cases have involved claims against the man-
ufacturers of DPT vaccine.i'" These claims are based on both failure to warn
and defective design. Failure to warn claims typically involve allegations that vac-
cine manufacturers have failed to provide adequate information about the inher-
ent risk of DPT vaccine/?" or have failed to communicate this information to
vaccine users."? Design defect claims allege that manufacturers have used a
whole-cell pertussis vaccine design rather than less toxic split-cell or acellular vac-
cine designs.":
Vaccine manufacturers have responded to failure to warn claims by contend-
ing that they should be immune from liability because their products contain
204. 21 U.S.c. §§301-393 ('982).
205. 42 U.S.c. §§274b, 262 (1982).
206. See Comment, Warnings and the Pharmaceutical Companies: Legal Status oj the Pack-
age Insert, 16 HOUSTONL. REv. '40, 143 (1978) (the entire process of drug manufacture is closely
regulated by the FDA).
207. E.g., see Osburn v. Anchor Laboratories, Inc., 825 Ead 908,912-13 (5th Cir. 1987);
Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 Rad 652, 658 (1St Cir. 1981); Salmon v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1364 (qth Cir. 1975); Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 248 (E.D.
Pa. 1990);Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 383 (D. Md. 1975), off'd, 567 F.2d
269 (qth Cir. 1977); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65,7° (Mass. 1985).
208. DPT vaccine provides protection against diphtheria, pertussis (whopping cough), and tet-
anus. Injuries from DPT are usually caused an adverse reaction to toxins contained in the pertus-
sis component of the vaccine. See Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1485-6 (D.
Kan. 1987).
209. See Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, I I 15 (qth Cir.), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 260 (1988); Jones v. Lederle Laboratories, 695 F. SuPP. 700, 708 (E.D.N. Y. 1988); Mar-
tinkovic v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Graham v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1499 (D. Kan. 1987).
2IO. See Jones v. Lederle Laboratories, 695 F. Supp. 700,708 (E.D.N. Y. 1988); Foyle v. Lederle
Laboratories, 674 F. Supp. 530, 536 (E.D.N.C. 1987); White v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 533
N.E.2d 748, 755 (Ohio 1988).
2I I. The pertussis component of DPT contains killed whole-cell organisms. These organisms
contain toxins that, if not removed, can cause adverse reactions. See Toner v. Lederle Laborato-
ries, 779 F.2d 1429, 1430 (cth Cir. 1986); Jones v. Lederle Laboratories, 695 F. Supp. 700, 702
(E.D.N.Y. 1988). Split-cell vaccines contain pertussis cells that have been fragmented by a chemi-
cal process. Split-cell vaccines contain fewer toxins than whole-cell vaccines. See White v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Ohio 1988). Acellular vaccines contain antigens rather
than whole cells of the pertussis organism. They are also less toxic than whole-cell vaccines. See
David & Jalilian-Marian, DPT: Drug Manufacturers' Liability in Vaccine Related Injuries, 7 J. LE-
GAL MEDICINE 187, 202 (1986).
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FDA-approved warnings. However, most courts have rejected this argument."?
Manufacturers have resisted design defect claims by arguing that the FDA has
only approved the manufacture of whole-cell pertussis vaccine, and therefore,
design defect claims based on failure to use non-approved designs should be pre-
empted. Once again, the courts have generally rejected the manufacturers'
preemption argument. 213
Nothing in either the FDCA or the PHSA expressly preempts common-law
clairns.?" The legislative history of these provisions is also silent on the issue of
preemption.?" The same is true of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986,216which established a compensation scheme for victims of vaccine-
related injuries.t'? Consequently, Cipollone, with its emphasis on express
preemption, is not likely to provide much help in resolving the OPT vaccine
preemption controversy.
It has been suggested that the pervasiveness of federal regulation over phar-
maceutical products in general.I'" and vaccines in particular';"? indicates that
the federal government has occupied the field. However, the Court has indicated
in the past that common-law claims will not be preempted merely because of the
existence of a comprehensive regulatory scheme.P? Thus, if the Court decides
to preempt either failure to warn claims or design defect claims, it will probably
have to do so on direct conflict grounds.
212. See Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173. I q8 {yth Cir. 1988); Abbot v. Amer-
ican Cyanamid Co., 844 Ead 1108, 1113 (qth CiT. 1988); Foyle v. Leder!e Laboratories, 674 F. Supp.
530, 533 (E.D.N.C. 1987); Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories. 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987);
Martinkovic v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Wack v. Lederie
Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 123, 127-28 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
213. See Hurley v. Lederle Laboratories. 863 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1988); Abbot v. Amer-
ican Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, Ill) (qth Cir. 1988); Jones v. Lederle Laboratories, 695 F. Supp.
700,7" (E.D.N.Y. '988); Foyle v. Lederle Laboratories, 674 F. Supp. 530, 534 (E.D.N.C. 1987);
Martinkovic v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 212, 215 (N.D. 111.1987); Morris v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1338-39 (C.D. Cal. 1987); MacGillivray v. Lederle Laboratories,
667 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D.N.M. I987); Wack v. Lederle Laboratories, 666 F. Supp. 123, I26 (N.D.
Ohio 1987); Patten v. Ledrle Laboratories, 655 F. Supp. 745, 750 (D. Utah 1987).
214. See Note, Federal Preemption: A Vaccine Manufacturer's Defense. 56 UMKC L. REV.
515,531 (1988).
215. See Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts Co-Regulate", 43
FOODDRUG& COSMoL.J. 85, 112 (1988).
2I6. Pub. L. 99-660, '00 Stat. 3755 (1986), now codified at 42 U.S.c. §§300aa-I to 300aa-
33 (Supp. 1987).
217. See Dark, Is the National Childhood Injury Act of 1986 the Solution to the DRP Con-
troversy?, 19 U. ToL. L. REV. 799, 843-49 (1988); Schwartz & Mahshigian, National Childhood
Injury Act oj 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window jar the Future?, 48 OHIOST. L.J. 387, 389-
92 (1987).
218. See Del Giomo, Comment, Federal Preemption of Prescription Drug Labeling: Antidote
jor Pharmaceutical Industry Overdosing in State Court Jury Decisions in Products Liability Cases,
22 J. MARSHALLL. REV. 629, 642 (1989) (expressing surprise at refusal of courts to preempt fail-
ure to warn claims).
219. See Note, Tort Liability jor DPT Vaccine Injury and the Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND.
L. REV. 655. 689 (1989).
220. See Hillsborough County V. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707,7'7-
18 (1985).
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In the case of failure to warn claims, some commentators argue that tort lia-
bility would interfere with the FDA's policy of "rational prescribing" by induc-
ing drug manufacturers to place warnings on their products that exaggerate
known risks or raise unwarranted concerns about unproven risks.F' However,
this argument ignores the fact that the FDA has complete control over the con-
tent of drug labeling and can refuse to approve any proposed labeling. In addi-
tion, the FDA has the power to expressly preempt failure to warn claims if it feels
that they interfere with its regulatory objectives.P?
It has also been suggested that design defect claims based on the use of whole-
cell pertussis organisms in OPT vaccine undermine the FDA's regulatory author-
ity by allowing juries to substitute their judgment for that of the agency 223
However, as a number of courts have observed, the FDA cannot force a man-
ufacturer to develop a safer design; it can only evaluate a design when a manu-
facturer submits it for approval. Therefore, an approved design is not necessarily
safer than one that has not been approved.P" For this reason, a jury finding
that a alternative design is safer than an approved design does not challenge the
FDA's regulatory authority unless the agency has actually disapproved the alter-
native design.
A final argument for preemption is that tort claims have caused vaccine man-
ufacturers to raise prices substantially or leave the market altogether, thus threat-
ening the supply of essential vaccines.?" However, the failure of Congress to
preempt tort claims against vaccine manufacturers when it enacted the NCVIA
suggests that Congress did not believe that tort actions would seriously interfere
with the statute's protective scheme for vaccine manufacturcrs.F"
Medical Devices
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 authorize the FDA to approve the
manufacture and sale of medical devices.'" Section 360k(a) specifically limits
221. See Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug
Administration, 4' FOOD DRUG COSMoL.J. 233, 238 (1986); Walsh & Klein, The Conflicting Objec-
tives of Federal and State Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG COSMoL.J. 171, 188 (1986).
222. See Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, I I 12 (ath Cir. 1988);Morris v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1338 (C.O. Cal. 1987); MacGillivray v. Lederle Labora-
tortes, 667 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D.N.M. 1987); but see Taylor, Federal Preemption and Food and
Drug Regulation: The Practical, Modern Meaning of an Ancient Doctrine, 38 FOOD DRUGCOSM.
L.J. 306, 315-17 (1983) (expressing doubt about the FDA's legal authority to administratively pre-
empt state law).
223. See Naile, Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine Injury and the Preemption Doctrine, 22
IND. L. REV. 655. 694 (1989).
224. See Hurley v, Lederle Laboratories, 863 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. (988); White v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 757 (Ohio 1988).
225. See David & Jalilian-Marian, DPT: Drug Manufacturers' Liability in Vaccine Related Inju-
ries, 7 J. LEGALMEDICINE187, 188 (1986) (manufacturers threaten to cease production of vaccines
because of potential tort liability); Comment, Comment K Immunity to Strict Liability: Should All
Prescription Drugs Be Protected?, 26 HOUSTON L. REV. 707, 718 (1989) (price of DPT vaccine rose
from II cents per dose in 1982 to $11.40 per dose in 1986).
226. See Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, r I 13-14 (ath CiT. 1988).
227. 21 U.S.c. §§360c to 360-k (1982).
228. ld., §360k(a).
229. 21 C.ER. §808.I(b) (1990).
230. E.g., see Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333 (]th Cir. 1992) (design
defect claim against manufacturer of interocular lens preempted under "investigational device exemp-
tion"); but see Mitchel! v, lolab Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877, 879 (E.n. La. 1988) (claim against man-
ufacturer of intraocular lens based on lack of informed consent not preempted).
231. 47 Fed. Reg. 26,985 (1982), now codified at 21 C.P.R. §8oI.430 (1990).
232. See Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243. 247 (5th Cir. 1989); Bejarano v. Inter-
national Playtex, Inc .. 750 F. Supp. 443, 445-46 (D. Idaho 1990); Nothrip v. International Play-
lex, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 402, 405 (W.O. Mo. 1990); Krause v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 749 F. Supp.
164, 168-69 (W.D. Mich. 1990); Cornelison v. Tambrands, Inc., 7'0 F. Supp. 706, 709 (D. Minn.
1989); Meyer v. International Playtex, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 288, 292 (D.N.J. 1988); Lavetter v. Inter-
national Playtex, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 722, 723 (D. Ariz. 1988); Rinehart v. International Playtex,
Inc., 688 F. Supp. 475, 477 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Edmonson v. International Playtex, Inc., 678 F. Supp.
'57',1572 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.S.C.
1987); Poloney v. Tambrands, Inc., 399 S.E.2d 208, 209 (Ga. 1991); Berger v. Personal Products,
Inc., 797 P.2d 1148, '152 (Wash. 1990); but see Lindquist v. Tambrands, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1058,
1062 (D. Minn. 1989) (§808. tfb) does not unambiguously interpret the MDA as preempting common-
law standards).
It should be noted that design defect claims against tampon manufacturers may not be preempted
under §36ok(a), because the FDA has not established any design standards for these products. See
Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1989); Bejarano v. International Play-
lex, tnc., 750 F. Supp. 443, 446 (D. Idaho 1990); Rinehart v. International Ptoytex, Inc., 688 F.
Supp. 475, 478 (S.D. Ind. 1988).
233. See Sychalla v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1026 (D.N.J. 1988). The copper
irritates the lining of the uterus and interferes with the implantation of the egg onto the uterine wall.
!d.
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the power of states and localities to impose "requirements" for medical devices
that are additional to, or inconsistent with, federal regulations.F" Furthermore,
the FDA has concluded that this provision applies to court decisions, as well as
legislation and administrative regulations.F" For this reason, the courts have
usually accepted preemption arguments.P? Many of these cases have involved
claims against tampon manufacturers for failure to warn against the risk of Toxic
Shock Syndrome (TSS). The FDA has required manufacturers to warn about the
risk of TSS, but it has not required that any specific language be used.!" So
far, almost every court has found these claims to be preempted.P!
Injured consumers have also brought suit against the makers of intrauterine
devices for failing to warn about the risks of pelvic inflammatory disease (PID)
in some users. Most of these suits have involved the CU-7 IUD, a plastic and cop-
per device that releases small amounts of copper into the uterus.?" Because the
CU-7 IUD was not composed of chemically inert materials, the FDA approved
it as a prescription drug, rather than as a medical device, in 1974- '34 Since the
CU-7 IUD was not approved as a medical device, many courts have refused to
apply section 36ok(a), to these products.s" Moreover, a few courts have
234. See Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. II42, 1145 (D. Or. 1989). The manufac-
turer voluntarily withdrew the CU-7 IUD from the market in 1986. Id.
'35. See Col/an v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 66" 666 (D. Md. 1989); AI/en v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 708 F. Supp. 1142, 1151 (D. Or. 1989); Spychalla v. G.D. Searle & Co., 705 F. Supp.
1024, 1029 (D.N.J. 1988); Tarallo v. Searle Pharmaceutical, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 653. 657 (D.S.C.
1988).
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rejected the FDA's interpretation of section 36ok(a) and ruled that Congress did
not intend for it to apply to common-law tort actions.i" This, of course, is
inconsistent with the rationale of the tampon cases.
Like Cipollone, the medical device cases involve the interpretation of a spe-
cific preemption provision. If the Court follows Cipollone's reasoning, it will
probably apply an express preemption analysis. Although the text of section
36ok(a) differs somewhat from the text of the cigarette labeling statute's preemp-
tion provision, it does use the term "requirement" to describe the sort of state
action that is preempted. Thus, one might expect the Court to reach the same
conclusion here as it did in Cipollone. Arguably, the case for preemption is even
stronger than it was in Cipollone, because the regulatory agency involved has
interpreted section 36ok(a) to preempt common-law claims.P" For these rea-
sons, the Court is likely to uphold preemption of common-law claims with respect
to medical devices in cases where the manufacturer has complied with FDA design
or labeling standards.r"
Conclusion
Justice Stevens's attempt to reach a reasonable compromise on the preemp-
tion issue in Cipollone ultimately satisfied no one. Advocates of a broad view
of federal preemption undoubtedly preferred Justice Scalia's reasoning, whereas
critics of preemption probably agreed with Justice Blackmun. It must be admit-
ted that Justice Scalia's observations were both forceful and perceptive. Unfor-
tunately, his analytical approach avoided any discussion of the policy concerns
involved in Cipollone. For example, nothing was said about the effect of preemp-
tion 'on the accident-cost avoidance and risk-distribution objectives of product
liability law. Justice Blackmun's opinion addressed these issues, and also showed
some sensitivity to the concerns of federalism and state sovereignty. A preemp-
tion analysis should take these factors into account, at least in cases like Cipol-
lone, where Congress has not made its intentions clear. For this reason, to this
author at least, Justice Blackmun's reasoning was more persuasive.
236. See Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 668 (D. Md. 1989); Kociemba v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (D. Minn. 1988).
237- See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to agency interpretation of its statute, if its interpreta-
tion is a permissible one, when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the issue in
question). See also Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretation
of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND.L. REV. 301, 305-08 (1988) (agencies, not courts, should resolve
policy issues).
238. However, the Court would probably not treat the CU-7 IUD as a medical device. There-
fore, claims against the manufacturer of this particular IUD may not be preempted.
